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In this paper, I will examine relations between Levinas’ philosophy and 
enactivism. At first glance, Levinas and enactivism have little in common. In 
fact, Levinas is well-known for his critique of ontology as well as his critique 
of naturalistic ethics,1 while, generally speaking, enactivism explicitly defends 
a naturalistic-ontological model of cognition.2 For Levinas, the primary 
relation is the encounter with the other, that is, an absolute otherness that 
cannot be explained in terms of a theoretical model of being, in the sense of a 
naturalistic ontology that outlines the nature of things. Conversely, for 
enactivism, embodied lived existence finds its origins in natural interactions 
with the physical world that run into an organism’s biological functions (e.g. 
autopoiesis). Moreover, there exists little secondary literature that connects 
enactivism with Levinas.3  
Yet, I will argue that there is nonetheless a mutual complementarity 
between Levinas and enactivism, in the sense that they can mutually correct 
each other to a certain extent, even if there is by no means any compatibility. In 
order to make my case, I will focus on Di Paolo, Cuffari and De Jaegher’s 
version of enactivism, in particular on their concept of participatory 
sensemaking in relation to their notion of linguistic bodies, according to 
which human relations with others are naturally caring and cooperative 
relations through language.4 According to this idea, ethical relations originate 
naturally from interactions with others. Levinas, in contrast, thinks of 
relations with others in terms of an intrinsic asymmetry and passivity, and 
therefore relations of cooperation, for him, fit into the category of ontology.5 
Hence, Levinas and enactivism defend two incompatible positions, a 
naturalistic understanding of ethics for enactivism and a defense, for Levinas, 
of an ethics exceeding our natural tendency toward participation.   
My claim is that this incompatibility does not necessarily lead to an 
exclusion in the sense that both Levinas and enactivism are important for 
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understanding ethics and justice. In order to make this point, I will argue in 
the first part of this paper that enactivists point to the significance of defining 
cooperation and intersubjectivity for understanding ethical relations by 
introducing the notion of participatory sensemaking. Participatory 
sensemaking means that we naturally cooperate through language and that 
we thus develop a spontaneous ethical know-how (e.g. care through 
sympathy). What makes ethical participation understood in this sense 
valuable is precisely the difference between the subjects involved in the 
participation. Not only is participation only possible by combining different 
efforts and perspectives, but participation is only ethically valuable if one 
party can give something to another who needs it, as in care for example. 
Nonetheless, Levinas offers a correction to enactivism by demonstrating 
that there is an ethically meaningful otherness in relations with other human 
beings, which differs from this notion of difference implied in the concept of 
participatory sensemaking. We are incapable of experiencing another’s 
experiences and in that sense another is absolutely other. Yet, this brings with 
it a difficult responsibility that exceeds ethical know-how or participation. We 
cannot take the place of another suffering that we ethically care for. I will 
argue that Levinas thus highlights the difficulty of ethical relations and points 
out that ethics requires a responsibility that exceeds the capability of 
participation. Thus, Levinas criticizes participation in that it implies an equal 
distribution of tasks and rights, which ends the asymmetry that responsibility 
calls for (see his notions of the third and justice).   
In the second part of this article, I will then argue that even though 
Levinas and enactivism take radically different positions, they do not 
necessarily exclude each other. More exactly, Levinas and enactivism share a 
similar concept of subjectivity, at least as far as Totality and Infinity is 
concerned, which is inspired by the phenomenological idea that lived 
existence is embodied and embedded in a natural environment. For 
enactivism, subjectivity implies natural interactions with the physical 
environment as in nourishing for example, and for Levinas, subjectivity 
results from natural interactions with the physical world as well, through 
enjoyment, dwelling, reason and other natural and cultural activities.  
In the final part of this article, I will argue that combining Levinas and 
enactivism, based on their shared concept of subjectivity, offers an answer to 
a problem scholars find in Levinas’ thought on justice.6 For Levinas, justice 
implies a third party and a reduction of otherness to a justice system. Yet, 
simultaneously the relation with the other is a condition of justice for Levinas. 
There is thus an ambiguity in Levinas’ thought on justice and enactivism 
offers a way out in that allows thinking of justice as based on participatory 
sense making, a naturally and culturally embedded form of social 
cooperation. Combining enactivism with Levinas then enables making 
distinctions between several levels of justice: social justice, a social 
construction and justice for others. If one accepts that Levinas and enactivism 
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have similar concepts of subjectivity, I will then redefine the ethical dimension 
of dwelling in terms of natural cooperation, which Levinas overlooks. Levinas 
finds himself confronted with an ambiguity while thinking justice because 
justice is itself ambigious, that is, it finds its meaning in opposite poles: mutual 
cooperation and responsibility for the other. 
 
Otherness and Participation 
Enactivism is a significantly growing field in philosophy of mind, as well 
as in cognitive science. It finds its origin in Varela, Thompson’s and Rosch’s 
The Embodied Mind, and defines cognition, generally speaking, in terms of a 
natural relation between an organism and its environment.7 Several of the 
early versions of enactivism adopt the biological concept of autopoiesis, 
according to which an organism is a system (consisting itself of a series of 
subsystems) that is capable of maintaining and reproducing itself within its 
natural environment.8 For enactivists, autopoiesis, which for example occurs 
in the cell cycle, is part of a human organism’s larger evolutionary effort to 
maintain and reproduce itself by interacting in certain ways with the natural 
environment (e.g. nourishing, finding shelter, keeping warm, etc.). Cognition, 
understood in the sense of the gathering of information through thoughts, 
experience and the senses, is then an integrated part of these interactions with 
the environment. 
In recent years, enactivists have been focusing on the social and 
normative aspects of cognition while introducing the notion of participatory 
sense-making.9 Participatory sensemaking means that humans are naturally 
cooperative insofar that they tend to participate with each other to find 
solutions to problems in their surroundings. In other words, in our relations 
with the surrounding environment, there exist different kinds of social 
interaction processes that run into the core of our self-constitution and self-
affection, to the extent that social interactions change how we perceive, think 
and act. These relations are not just purely natural but intrinsically contain 
language and loop into culture. It is easy to see that this is the case, for 
instance, when thinking of a typical conversation between two persons. 
Talking to another person often changes our point of view or makes us look 
at things differently. 
The notion of participatory sensemaking is attractive. Di Paolo, Cuffari 
and De Jaegher make a convincing argument that ethical relations naturally 
flow out of social relations.10 Because social relations are intrinsically 
linguistic relations, these also are naturally ethically significant. That is to say, 
by interacting and talking with others we develop a certain “ethical know-
how,” for example, how to sympathize with others or what equality and 
justice means.11 Thus, we are what they define as linguistic bodies in that we 
naturally communicate and consequently have a potential of acting ethically. 
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By developing the idea of participatory sensemaking, enactivists thus 
explain in an elegant way how ethical questions turn up in a worldly and 
practical manner. Rather than developing a theoretically abstract ethical 
theory or assuming the existence of universal ethical norms, Di Paolo and 
colleagues demonstrate that in our daily lives we naturally face ethical 
situations (others that need care) and rely on shared knowledge about how to 
address these situations. And this is a sound idea. Within communities that 
share languages there do exist certain values and norms that have ethical 
meaning. This is not to claim that social values or norms are naturally always 
‘good’ or cannot be corrupt. Ethical know-how is not free from “imperfection 
and ambiguity.”12 
More exactly, linguistic bodies are vulnerable bodies. Specific examples 
of vulnerabilities are “systematic impairments of linguistic becoming 
(isolation, neurological conditions),” but also “exclusion, impairments to 
participation, lack of recognition, not being skillful in a foreign language or 
the language of a subcommunity, neurophysiological impairments, mental 
disorders, neurodegenerative diseases, trauma.”13 Obviously, communication 
can fail. On the one hand, humans are vulnerable and therefore demand 
particular ethical care or attention. On the other hand, ethical know-how is 
also itself fallible. We can make mistakes in caring for others or can be 
incapable of doing enough (such as misinterpretation in sympathy or not 
giving enough space to another). 
Yet, the idea of participatory sensemaking is also problematic, so I will 
assert, in that it runs the risk of downplaying the role of otherness in ethical 
relations. By this I do not mean that the idea does not allow for others. Clearly, 
the idea that linguistic bodies are vulnerable bodies reflects to a certain extent 
a notion of otherness in the sense of difference. The examples above reflect the 
differences of others who do not have the same capacities as us. Not only is 
the essence of participation combining different capacities, such as efforts or 
point of views. What is more, vulnerable parties within participatory 
sensemaking relations are impaired in a certain way, and therefore ethical 
action, such as care, is required from the other parties. The ethical significance 
of the concept of participatory sensemaking thus results from the fact that 
participation includes participation between different parties, that is, between 
capable selves and impaired others (and vice versa). 
Nonetheless, as Levinas demonstrates, otherness is significant in another 
sense than what is described above. For Levinas, otherness signifies the 
“transcendence” of the other or an alterity, “which is infinitely distant from 
my own reality.”14 This means that the otherness of another, which manifests 
itself in face-to-face relations with other humans, cannot be defined by 
reference to oneself, for example as another who is, unlike me, impaired of 
speaking or of participatory sensemaking in some other way. Levinas 
explicitly states that otherness is not the otherness of a “patient who suffers” 
or of a “poor man who longs for wealth,” in the sense that otherness in these 
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cases refers to what it negates: well-being and wealth.15 Otherness in face-to-
face relations refers to that which one does not have or cannot understand. 
This otherness is ‘behind’ the face. It is that which one cannot understand 
about the other or anticipate in any ethical know-how, not because of failed 
communication, but because it cannot be communicated.  
While enactvists focus on explaining cognition and ethical know-how as 
a natural interaction with the environment, Levinas argues in a very different 
way that “responsibility for the other” comes first.16 There exist several 
different interpretations on how to understand this responsibility, for 
example whether it is a sensibility to transcendence or a vulnerability toward 
other human beings, which already have been discussed extensively.17 I will 
therefore not go into too much detail of these discussions here. Yet, in order 
to make my comparison with enactivism, I will focus on Levinas’ assertion 
that in face-to-face relations we are called to responsibility in the sense that 
we are sensible to another’s otherness, which we cannot simply anticipate.18 
Levinas’ notion of otherness cannot be accounted for in an enactive 
understanding of participatory sensemaking, because participatory 
sensemaking expresses the idea that participation and communication are 
either possible or impaired, completely or to a certain extent. Consequently, 
the idea of participatory sensemaking downplays, to a certain extent, the 
significance of otherness for ethics. Levinas’ demonstrates that a reference to 
absolute otherness is significant for ethics. Such a reference is significant in 
that others for whom we are responsible are human beings that we cannot 
fully grasp or they are more the counter poles of our action and 
communication.  
What others feel, experience or think is sometimes impossible to 
communicate or unthinkable, not because communication is impaired, but 
since one cannot enter the mind of another. From a practical perspective, it is 
of course good to apply our ethical know-how. Yet, from an ethical 
perspective, this is not all there is to it. That is to say, there is not just an ethical 
demand in the know-how itself (in the practical wisdom how to care for 
another’s well-being), nor in the vulnerability of the other (the absence of 
another’s well-being), but also in another’s otherness: We are responsible for 
others who are in a sense unknowable, unpredictable and non-
understandable. What makes this particularly ethically significant and 
challeging is the impossibility and difficulty of the burden of this 
responsibility. For example, we cannot suffer the pain of another in his or her 
place, and that is what makes caring for another so difficult as an ethical task 
in situations when another is in great pain. 
To see more clearly why this is ethically important, consider the 
following case of prosthetic treatment in health care. Medical studies report 
that patients who undergo prosthetic treatment often face a constant struggle 
in using and maintaining their prostheses, such as limb prostheses.19 There 
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are several reasons why this is the case. One of the contributing factors is that 
the patients in question are often elderly persons. And this contrasts with how 
the media often depicts prosthetic use, since the emphasis is often on young 
healthy people such as Paralympic athletes. Not that highlighting the latter 
category is bad in itself, yet what is often forgotten is the need of appropriate 
medical treatment of patients using a prosthesis, on the contrary, requires 
setting realistic goals and communicating well. 
There are several different points of view one can take to look at these 
cases. From the perspective of the idea of participatory sensemaking, patients 
undergoing prosthetic treatment are of course vulnerable human beings. And 
communication with these patients may be difficult, in a certain sense 
impaired, since we do not know what it feels like to be in their position. Yet, 
from a Levinasian perspective, an intrinsic vulnerability or fragility resides in 
the relation between the patients and health care professionals, that is, a 
vulnerability that does not completely coincide with the patient’s impairment, 
but a fragility that is proper to the relation itself. One cannot gain access to the 
experiences of the patient or to his or her lived existence. In that sense, the 
patient is absolutely other. One has no access to this otherness. And that is 
what makes responsibility for the patient so difficult: one is exposed to 
another’s vulnerability without the possibility of overcoming it completely, 
despite all of the expertise and ethical know-how one can possibly have.    
Levinas demonstrates that defining responsibility for another in terms of 
ethical know-how is insufficient. This does not mean that this know-how is 
inefficient. Of course, the cases mentioned above indicate how important 
efficient medical and ethical know-how are in order to adequately care for 
patients undergoing prosthetic treatment. Nevertheless, defining ethical 
relations in terms of know-how is only highlighting one side of the coin. This 
relation also involves others to whom we can never adequately respond since 
we cannot take over their experiences and suffering. In other words, Levinas 
reminds us that ethics is not only, or not even in the first place, a practical task 
but also an impossible challenge or “imperative” as he also calls it.20 And this 
is an important reminder that we are dealing in ethical relations not only with 
a person who is incapable to a certain extent, a patient that needs to be treated, 
but with others that have their own singular lived existence, another human 
being that we cannot simply categorize as a condition or disease, or even 
vulnerability. 
Levinas reminds us, in other words, that ethics starts off, not with 
participation, but with an impossible task, to which participation can only be 
an incomplete response. According to Levinas ethics also results from a 
language relation with the other, but this is not the natural linguistic 
cooperation enactivists have in mind. He writes, “the face speaks to me and 
thereby invites me to a relation incommensurate with a power exercised.”21 
Ethics thus commences in a face-to-face relation with another, when another 
speaks, but by speaking questions one’s knowledge, one’s (ethical) know-
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how. Ethics means that we are responsible not only for vulnerable people or 
in natural cooperation, but also for others we cannot in any way grasp. 
Levinas designates the face-to-face relation with his well-known 
expression “you shall not commit murder.”22 Language, for Levinas, should 
thus be understood in the face-to-face relation not in the first place as 
communication, but as a call to “responsibility.”23 When we encounter 
another face-to-face, this is not just, or not necessarily, an invitation for 
communication, but the realization that the other we encounter is a human 
being capable of speaking. And this realization disrupts the spontaneity of 
one’s relation with the natural world.24 One is not alone here to enjoy and to 
nourish oneself. There are others who need nourishment, possibly suffer, or 
whose food one is possibly consuming. In this sense, language leads to ethics 
for Levinas, to a call to responsibility. 
Yet, one might argue at this point that the notion of participatory 
sensemaking is basically expressing a similar thought as Levinas’ face-to-face, 
namely, that language shows the vulnerability of others that demand our 
attention and thus call us to responsibility. However, the difference between 
enactivism and Levinas is also apparent in relations with others that exercise 
violence. Violence is also in a sense a form of vulnerability or an incapacity of 
participation, but it is not just failed participation. Violence calls, perhaps 
more urgently than any other relation, to our responsibility. A psychopathic 
murderer, for example, is not just someone we can ignore or even see as a case 
of failed communication and participation (due to a lack of empathy). Such 
people create deep injustices and demand a difficult responsibility, as we 
need to respond to their actions in a way to ensure he or she will do no harm, 
which implies more than just care or practical wisdom, or even a justice 
system (even though all of these things are also required). It requires a 
response that is always necessarily insufficient, because we fail to understand 
the murderer’s action and cannot undo them. Yet, we need to respond to 
them.   
Levinas shows that responsibility for others has an intrinsic impossibility 
to it. We cannot, for example, take responsibility for a psychopathic 
murderer’s actions in the sense that they are another’s actions, not our own. 
Yet, we are responsible for them in another sense, namely in that they demand 
a response. We will need to deal with them and live with them, even if there 
is a prospect that justice cannot completely be achieved. Levinas thus 
demonstrates, in contrast to enactivism, that it is overly simplistic to define 
ethical relations in terms of participation and fallible or failed participation. 
Participation can be part of a response to others, yet the ethical demand – its 
significance and its seriousness – is not located in participation itself (or at 
least not entirely), but in the call for responsibility of the other.25 
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A Holistic Approach to Subjectivity and Nature 
Even though the idea of participatory sensemaking downplays the 
significance of otherness for ethics, I will demonstrate in this section that 
Levinas’ philosophy is complementary with the core ideas of enactivism. This 
complementarity can be shown more exactly by investigating Totality and 
Infinity, in which Levinas defends a concept of subjectivity according to which 
we gain knowledge from the world by spontaneously interacting with our 
natural environment.26 This concept of subjectivity is close to how enactivists 
understand subjectivity in the sense of the capability of gaining knowledge 
through interactions with the environment.  
Certainly, Levinas’ philosophy as a whole is without doubt very different 
from enactivism. And this is particularly the case for Levinas’ later work, 
Otherwise than Being, which is, as its title indicates, a study that challenges 
traditional versions of ontology, understood as ontological naturalism, any 
theory that explains being, existence, in terms of natural phenomena, relations 
and principles.27 Enactivism, on the other hand, has a specific outlook on the 
nature of being, which enactivists understand in terms of natural and organic 
processes. In fact, while there exist of course different varieties of enactivism, 
as is known, enactivists generally speaking defend some kind of naturalism.28 
Gallagher explains that enactivism is a “philosophy of nature,” which means 
that it consists in a certain investigation of the “nature of the mind and the 
brain” and of “nature itself.”29  
The term enactivism thus covers various theories of cognition and 
understands the process of gaining knowledge in close relation to nature. In 
other words, enactivism understands the mind as essentially embodied and 
embedded in its natural environment. And it is this kind of naturalistic theory 
of knowledge that Levinas would question, that is, at least as far as otherness 
is concerned. According to him, otherness should not be explained as part of 
this natural relation with the environment. 
In Otherwise than Being we thus find several expressions questioning the 
idea that ethics can be naturalized. For example, Levinas writes that the “the 
human subject … is not an avatar of nature.”30 He states, moreover, that the 
other who affects the subject does not do so by “by resemblance or common 
nature.”31 He also calls “psychological naturalism” a “rhetoric” that is 
forgetful of what is “Good.”32 In other words, Levinas is clear in Otherwise than 
Being that responsibility should not be explained in terms of a naturalistic 
psychology, that is, a theory of consciousness or cognition that contains a 
certain logic of what it would mean to be ethical as a subject. Yet, at the same 
time Levinas notes that subjectivity is not “against” nature.33 Indeed, for 
Levinas, responsibility begins “on the hither side of the “state of nature,” yet 
“from which nature itself arises.”34 This means that even though ethics should 
not be naturalized, ethics can itself be meaningful for natural relations. As 
explained above, sensibility for otherness points at the purpose of ethics, its 
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difficulty, yet this does not imply that natural interactions are without any 
meaning, even given that ethics cannot completely be defined in naturalistic 
terms. 
Furthermore, enactivism generally does not defend a hard version of 
naturalism, but a naturalism that can connect to Levinas’ thoughts on nature. 
More exactly, understanding cognition the way enactivism does, as a natural 
process of acquiring knowledge through interactions with the environment, 
does not imply in any way defending a classical ontological naturalism. If one 
understands ontology in this sense, as Levinas also does, as a (philosophical) 
theory that explains being in a system or “thematization” of representations 
(ideas, thoughts, images) of how being actually is, then enactivism cannot be 
a defense of ontological naturalism.35 In fact, enactivism was originally 
developed as a critique of representationalism or any cognitive theory that 
explains cognition in terms of functions that represent the world in ways it 
actually is. In The Embodied Mind, Varela and colleagues present their project 
as an examination of “lived human experience,” instead of being founded on 
“the representation of a world that is independent of our perceptual and 
cognitive capacities.”36 They are thus close to a phenomenological conception 
of consciousness, which is based on concrete lived experience from the 
perspective of a self.  
In a general fashion, there is thus an overlap between Levinas’ 
philosophy and enactivism, in that both oppose representationalism. 
Furthermore, it would be wrong to simply assert that Levinas is against 
naturalism or a defender of a certain kind of supernaturalism while 
emphasizing the significance of transcendence in the sense of what lies 
‘behind’ the face. In fact, scholars have argued that Levinas himself favors a 
certain kind of naturalism. Fiona Ellis, for example, argues that Levinas 
defends a form of expansive naturalism.37 This means that, according to Ellis, 
Levinas holds that nature provides a condition of morality. Yet, ethics 
involves transcendence as well, and ethics cannot therefore be reduced to a 
purely natural relationship or manifestation. Values come into this world, into 
a natural world through relations with others. Yet, there is an egoistic 
dimension of nature that is nonhuman as well, that is, nature has a brutal or 
at least ignorant side to it. In a similar way Gallagher contends that enactivism 
is a kind of holistic naturalism or a philosophy of nature in the sense that it 
not only builds on empirical research and empirical science, but also on other 
traditions or relations that transcend empirical relations.38 
The extent to which nature has meaning for Levinas – and how this 
relates to enactivism – is clearly apparent in Totality and Infinity. In the second 
part of TI, “Interiority and Economy,” Levinas defines what he understands 
as “I,” a concept of subjectivity that designates a separated being or egoistic 
subject in the sense that this subject’s relation with nature is ‘carefree.’39 This 
relation starts with enjoyment.40 As Levinas states, enjoyment is a carefree 
“living from,” in the sense that we “live from “good soup,” air, light, 
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spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc.”41 Yet he immediately adds: “These are not 
objects of representation.”42 In other words, enjoyment as understood in this 
sense means not thinking about others or even about the object we are 
enjoying, since we spontaneously engage in a relation with the object in such 
a way that we gain pleasure from it. Enjoying good soup does not require a 
reflection on the meaning of soup. 
And this is a very ‘enactivist way’ of putting things. Certainly, according 
to the idea of participatory sensemaking, for enactivists care is also a natural 
relation.43 Yet, for enactivism we spontaneously engage in relations with our 
environment, in order to live from and within the elements that constitute this 
environment. This way of living from the environment does not necessarily 
involve representations in the sense of higher-order mental content (believes, 
ideas, intentions). 
Levinas is critical in particular of Husserl’s conception of 
phenomenology as a theory of representations. Levinas’ critique of Husserl is 
especially apparent in his later works. Yet already in Totality and Infinity, he 
states that Husserl’s phenomenology amounts to the “to the affirmation … 
that the object of consciousness, while distinct from consciousness, is, as it 
were, a product of consciousness, being a ‘meaning’.”44 In Otherwise than 
Being, Levinas states in a similarly critical voice: “The meaningful [for 
Husserl] refers to a cognitive subjectivity and to the mathematical 
configuration of logical structures.”45 As both quotes attest, Levinas’ 
questions Husserl’s idea that the essence of consciousness is representational 
in the sense that the task of phenomenology would be to define the logical 
essences of experiences. 
Similarly, enactivism questions that the main task of cognitive theory 
would be to pinpoint the representational content of higher-level 
representations, such as thoughts and ideas, of which he obviously does not 
deny the existence. Enactivism nevertheless questions the idea that cognition 
should be explained primarily in terms of representations that in a certain 
logical way represent the world. Enactivists thus have a similar critique of 
representationalism.46 Representations are already reflective, a product of 
consciousness, as Levinas puts it. By arguing that consciousness builds on 
enjoyment, not primarily on representations, Levinas thus defends an 
enactivist-like thesis, that is, the thesis that cognition starts with a 
spontaneous interaction with the natural environment on which higher-order 
cognitive relations build.    
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas continues his analysis of subjectivity with 
an analysis of nourishment.47 This concept is similar to an enactivist account 
of autopoiesis in that Levinas understands it as a making “interior,” within 
one`s body, of “exteriority,” the surrounding world, in order to live from this 
exteriority.48 Levinas’s notion of nourishment reflects the idea of autopoiesis 
the way enactivists understand it. Both concepts define the process of an 
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embodied subject surviving and living from its natural environment. 
Certainly, autopoiesis is in the first place a biological concept and Levinas is 
not a biologist, nor does his work draw on biological research. Yet, the 
enactivist interpretation of autopoiesis does not only or even primarily apply 
to cellular functions, as is the biological application, but to a larger notion of 
subjectivity that is inspired by phenomenology, as is Levinas’.  
My point is of course not to claim that the differences in argument, style 
and scientific context between enactivism and Levinas’ work are irrelevant. 
They certainly are not. Yet, enactivism and Levinas’ work have their point of 
departure in common, which is a concept of embodied subjectivity that is 
closer to Merleau-Ponty than to the early Husserl. Levinas identifies the 
existence of the “I” as economical in the ontological sense as the self’s 
“economy of being,” which has characteristics of a naturalism.49  
Yet, Levinas’ point is of course, as I argued in the previous section of this 
paper, that ethics should not simply be naturalized and transcends the “I.” 
Nonetheless, given that the ethical relation transcends subjectivity in Totality 
and Infinity, the relation between subject and the natural environment, which 
Levinas calls the “elemental,” is also the condition for the relation with the 
other.50 His notion of “dwelling” demonstrates this: “To dwell … is a 
recollection, a coming to oneself, as in a land of refuge, which answers to a 
hospitality, and expectancy, a human welcome.”51 In other words, when we 
have a roof over our heads, are sufficiently nourished and capable of enjoying, 
we are capable of welcoming others in our homes. To dwell, as understood in 
this sense, is to promote hospitality and thus our natural relations with our 
environment condition, even if indirectly, ethical relations with others. 
Moreover, it is only within this environment that we can meet others face-to-
face. 
Theories of enactivism also develop an understanding of natural 
relations being a condition for ethics, that is, they argue that ethical relations 
naturally emerge out of interactions with our environment. These relations 
are naturally part of participatory sensemaking. Levinas, clearly, takes a 
different approach to ethics, as I showed above. Although he understands 
natural relations with the environment as a basis for welcoming others, ethical 
relations with others should not be understood in terms of or as part of these 
natural relations, that is, as enjoyment, nourishment or dwelling or any other 
natural relation. Nonetheless, natural relations precondition social relations. 
On this Levinas and enactivists would agree. Ethical relations moreover give 
meaning to natural relations. In this enactivism and Levinas share the same 
view as well. Although enactivism and Levinas thus contradict each other (for 
enactivism natural relation are ethical and for Levinas not), they complement 
each other if we accept that both demonstrate an important side of ethics. That 
is to say, we can state that enactivism shows pre-ethical social interactions, 
whereas Levinas demonstrates the difficulty of ethical relations. Both of these 
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relations build on a notion of subjectivity, in the sense of embodied lived 
existence that enactivism and Levinas share. 
Levinas’ ethics can therefore connect to enactivism, be it as a correction 
of enactivism, if we take a concept of subjectivity as part of an expansive or 
holistic naturalism to be the point of departure of cognition to which ethics 
adds meaning. Given that both Levinas and enactivism share a similar 
concept of subjectivity, they share the idea that embodied subjectivity is a 
condition of ethics. Levinas embraces the idea, at least in Totality and Infinity, 
that natural relations with our environment are pivotal for the functioning of 
cognition. Levinas and enactivism furthermore share the idea that ethical 
relations with others change our interactions with nature. These relations 
make interactions with nature more valuable, in the sense that we can offer 
something to others, for example food or shelter. Levinas then in turn offers a 
correction to enactivism, or can complement it, in that he shows, as I argued 
in the previous part, that ethical relations transcend natural relation in the 
sense that responsibility for others requires more than natural participation. 
It requires a sensibility for otherness which cannot simply be understood in 
terms of natural participation or failed natural participation, because it goes 
beyond that which any kind of participation could possibly achieve. 
Levinas’ ethics thus connects to enactivism’s naturalistic holism. What 
ties together both positions is a shared concept of subjectivity based on 
interactions of dwelling in the environment in order to live from and live 
within it. Levinas and enactivism share this kind of basic notion of subjectivity 
because they both draw on the phenomenological idea of lived existence to 
develop a notion of subjectivity. My point is not to make of Levinas an 
enactivist. That would require naturalizing the face-to-face relation with the 
other, which would go against Levinas’ main message about otherness. Yet, 
my point is that both of these very different perspective on ethics are both 
valuable and they are complementary if one accepts a naturalistic conception 
of cognition, as Levinas himself does not appear to rule out. However, as I 
will argue in the next section, connecting Levinas to enactivism also implies 
correcting Levinas’ notion of dwelling and re-defining its ethical dimensions. 
 
Dwelling is a Condition of Justice 
Does enactivism, in turn, add something to Levinas’ work? If we agree 
with Levinas that ethics should not simply be naturalized, as I argued above, 
enactivism can nevertheless provide an answer to a problem several Levinas 
scholars find in Levinas’ work.52 More exactly, the problem is that there seems 
to be a contradiction in Levinas’ work. On the one hand, he thinks of the 
relation with the other as a condition for justice, and yet, on the other hand 
justice implies action and organization (of laws, rights, bills, etc.), which is 
again a reduction of otherness to an essence. Enactivism provides an answer 
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to this problem by showing that the condition of justice lies in natural 
interactions of a subject with the environment (participatory sensemaking), 
rather than in the relation with the other, even though this relation is a call for 
responsibility that transcends naturalism. Enactivism in confrontation with 
Levinas thus offers the suggestion, as I will show in this part, that we should 
make a distinction between natural cooperation that brings an ethical 
dimension to relations of dwelling.  
Several Levinas scholars have been arguing that there is an ambiguity in 
Levinas’ approach to justice. Arthur Cools, for example, points to what he 
understands as an “insurmountable paradox” in Levinas’ thought.53 This 
paradox is the following. On the one hand, Levinas thinks of responsibility 
for the other, as I argued, as a relation that is opposite to ontology or any 
essence of being. Yet, on the other hand, this responsibility is a condition for 
justice for Levinas in that it is a call for the good. Hence, Levinas contests 
traditional ways of thinking of justice in terms of norms and legal principles 
that are defined by a community or state. Yet, the consequence of this is that 
“the moral norms within society and the ethical meaning of the responsibility 
for this singular other are opposed to each other, such that it is not possible to 
be faithful to both at the same time.”54 Moreover, it is hard to see how 
responsibility for the other can be translated into a concrete commitment to a 
just society or even a concrete action of caring for another, since these require 
following norms as well as a certain logic, which are ontological features. 
They connect to higher-level cognitive capabilities, to put it in enactivist 
terminology. 
Indeed, in Totality and Infinity Levinas states that “language” in face-to-
face relations with the other is “justice” and that the “face qua face opens 
humanity,” meaning that justice should not be understood as dictated by a 
community or state but is the sensibility for otherness Levinas describes as the 
face-to-face.55 However, at the same time justice understood in the sense of 
equality in a society requires a “third part” and thus a disruption of the face-
to-face.56 According to Cools, Levinas even speaks of a “betrayal” of the 
ethical relation, when it comes to deliberation and comparison.57 The problem 
is thus that Levinas is unclear how justice could be anything else than a 
sensibility to otherness, or how it could even relate to what seems to be one 
its basic principles: equality. 
Enactivism’s idea of participatory sensemaking offers a way out of this 
paradox. Certainly, the idea of participatory sensemaking does not contain an 
explicitly elaborated concept of justice, that is, it focusses on natural social 
interaction, not on understanding social justice within the context of a legal 
system. Yet, the way in which linguistic bodies are entangled helps 
understanding how a demand for justice emerges out of natural social 
interactions. To see this more clearly, consider the notion of microaggressions, 
a sociological concept that Di Paolo and colleagues have adopted.58 
Microaggressions was a term first used to designate racial discrimination in 
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the U.S. in situations where white persons discriminate (a) black person(s) in 
small interpersonal exchanges that are very subtle but also carry an 
underlying power dynamic. Since its introduction the term microaggressions 
has been broadened beyond black-white relations, indicating forms of 
interpersonal exchanges of communicative behavior of marginalization and 
discrimination on a communal level.  An example is “the use of the word 
illegals to refer to people in the US seen as Latino/a.”59 Microaggressions 
demonstrate in a certain way how social injustice works. Linguistic bodies are 
not isolated entities, but entangled in networks of communication, in which 
on both a conscious and unconscious level inequality can emerge. This 
inequality is itself a demand for justice in that it does harm to marginalized 
groups. 
This idea of social justice, understood in the sense of a demand for 
equality caused by an unbalanced social relation that causes harm to 
minorities, is different from how Levinas understands justice. At first glance, 
it might seem that Levinas has a similar understanding of justice, that is, it 
seems that the otherness of individuals who are discriminated calls for justice. 
In a certain sense this is also true: minorities consist of others that call for a 
sensibility to otherness, which is ignored or negated by behavior like 
microaggressions. In other words, microaggressions have their own logic (or 
lack of it) that assimilates the other to the totality of a dominating subject and 
violent rhetoric. Yet, this is not all that is happening in cases of 
microaggressions. First of all, to speak of another in terms of a minority is 
already to categorize the other in a political realm of power relations. In the 
case of discrimination, the power interaction itself calls for justice, that is, the 
act of aggression that creates inequality, not the otherness of the victim, calls 
for doing social justice, for setting things right. In these cases, inequality calls 
for a social response and action: restoration of justice, for example, by calling 
out racist discourse. The confrontation with the interaction that causes 
discrimination feels as unjust, not the sensibility that we confront an 
unsurmountable otherness.     
Social justice as described above is similar to what Paul Ricoeur 
understands as a “sense of justice,” which is the feeling of injustice we 
experience when being confronted with the suffering or discrimination of 
another: “Unjust! What injustice!”60 It is this kind of feeling that we 
experience, possibly in different degrees of intensity, also when being 
confronted with microaggressions. For example, when being confronted with 
racist discourse we cannot help but experiencing a feeling of injustice. This 
experience is obviously not guaranteed, as often people fail to identify with 
it, as is also the case for microaggressors. Yet, the fact that ignorance lies at the 
basis of microaggressions proofs that sensibility to inequality and social action 
– which is different from sensibility to otherness – lies at the basis of social 
justice.  
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Another way of explaining this is by looking at Gallagher’s comparison 
between Levinas and enactivism.61 Gallagher uses the enactivist concept of 
enactive coupling in order to naturalize Levinas’ face-to-face relations. 
Enactive coupling refers to the way how relations work between co-
dependent systems. These relations are dynamic processes in which that what 
happens in one system is partly constituted by the other and vice versa. What 
Gallagher defends, when applying the notion of enactive coupling to explain 
face-to-face relations, is an explanation of face perception that is not just the 
perception of the physical features of a (human) face. The face moreover 
allows an emotional interaction between individuals. The face is thus not an 
isolated entity here, but embodied (posture, gesture, movement) and 
embedded in a social context (background of the person). How one person 
feels is co-dependent on how others feel. This dynamic process explains how 
microagressions work. A dominant social background can become a feeder of 
racist discourse between two persons in a conversation for example. Yet, the 
face-to-face also allows for sympathy with victims and feelings of injustice, 
which lead the way to social justice.   
Yet, my intention in this paper is not to naturalize the face-to-face 
relation. Doing so would break apart again the connection between 
enactivism and Levinas that I have been defending so far, since the other 
would then be reduced to a natural interaction. Rather, I am arguing that, 
apart from the face-to-face, there is a call for justice. Part of dwelling, the 
interactions with the world that allow us to live within this world, is politics 
in the sense of the influence of power relations on our intersubjective 
interactions. However, within our dwelling the aggressions of these relations 
themselves call for social justice, for participatory sensemaking to put it in 
enactivist terms.  
Certainly, social justice is more than a sense or a feeling of justice. As 
Ricoeur also explains, justice implies a legal system containing rules and 
guidelines, without which justice cannot work.62 To put it more simply: there 
can only be justice when there is a society. Levinas is well aware that this is 
the case. That is why he states that justice implies a third party. Moreover, 
justice also implies reason and representations, as represented in rules, trials 
and legal systems. Therefore, it transcends face-to-face relations. Therefore, 
an enactivist notion of participatory sensemaking does not necessarily 
contradict Levinas’ understanding of justice. For both enactivism and 
Levinas, justice exists within totality, in connection to natural relations, and 
made possible by representational language.  
Nonetheless, participatory sensemaking offers a correction of Levinas’ 
understanding of dwelling. The idea of participatory sensemaking shows that 
justice is conditioned by natural interactions with others, by dwelling itself to 
use Levinas’ term. By putting justice radically on the side of reason, of 
representations, Levinas overlooks the social dimension of nature, which is a 
condition for justice. Yet, this implies that Levinas’ radical distinction between 
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the face-to-face relation on the one hand (Levinas’ notion of responsibility), 
and, on the other hand, the sphere of totality, that is as part of our dwelling in 
the world, does not work for understanding justice. It does not work, because 
justice runs on both levels. 
A way out of the paradox Levinas sees himself confronted with is thus to 
admit that there is a different call for justice on the level of ‘dwelling.’ This is 
not the other’s call, but a call caused by inequality. In other words, one way 
of confronting the paradox is by embracing the paradox. Rather than making 
a radical opposition between justice and ethics, one can state that justice 
works on different levels. Following enactivism, justice gradually emerges out 
of natural relations. Yet, this is justice on a practical level, as a cooperation, 
that ultimately into institutionalized justice. The reason there is an ambiguity 
between being faithful to this kind of justice and to justice for absolute 
otherness is because the different meanings of justice contradict each other. 
Yet, they can complement each other in the sense that our responsibility for 
the other shows the difficulty of ethical relations in the real world, as I argued 
in the first part of this paper. We can only do justice to others in this world, 
but this is in a sense never enough. This is confirming Levinas’ point that 
justice requires the third, but by stressing the natural roots of justice. 
In fact, enactivism’s idea that we are linguistic bodies shows that 
sensemaking is not a solitary business, but always the result of different 
interactions with others. Levinas is correct to point out that a subject is a 
totality who reduces otherness while spontaneously bathing in a natural 
environment (e.g. enjoyment). In this sense, as he points out, an ego, a subject 
aims to maintain oneself (cf. autopoiesis). Nonetheless, to a certain extent 
Levinas insufficiently thinks the social depth of a subject’s relation with the 
environment. Embodied beings are embedded in their natural and cultural 
environment and in that sense these environments are co-constitutive for how 
we act, think and live and ultimately implement justice.  
These natural social interactions thus lead to social justice systems 
through complex linguistic relations, which are a practical demand within 
communities. Hence, one way out of the paradox Levinas finds himself 
confronted with is to accept the paradox and that there are different meanings 
of justice. This means that Levinas is correct. Social justice reduces otherness 
inevitably since it always implies a distribution and thus a categorization of 
others in a system. There is a practical and social justice on the level of totality. 
Yet, there is also justice in the sense of ethics, the good, as a sensibility to 
otherness. Hence, the difficulty of ethics. Yet facing this ambiguity of justice 
implies finetuning the several meanings justice has, as I am arguing for, and 
thinking social justice along with enactivism in line with a subject’s embodied 
interactions with the social and cultural environment.  
The notion of participatory sensemaking thus further explains why there 
is an ambiguity when thinking justice. Justice depends on the fallible nature 
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of human cooperation and therefore a radical distinction between justice for 
others and social justice cannot hold. Justice is ambiguous because it can only 
be achieved in a natural world, and therefore it can never be fully achieved, 
even though humans have an infinite responsibility to achieve justice.    
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have been arguing that Levinas and enactivism mutually 
complement each other. By this I mean that Levinas corrects something 
enactivism misses as a theory, namely, a reference to otherness. And in turn, 
enactivism corrects something which Levinas’ thought insufficiently 
highlights, namely, the dimension of social justice we find in dwelling in the 
natural environment.  
What conclusion can we draw then from this mutual complementarity? 
First of all, in their concept of cognition, Levinas and enactivists do not 
essentially differ. According to enactivism, a subject gains knowledge while 
naturally and spontaneously interacting with the surrounding environment. 
According to Levinas in Totality and Infinity, a subject gains knowledge 
through similar interactions. Building on spontaneous experience of the 
elemental, we gain knowledge by interiorizing the exterior, that is, higher-
order representations gradually emerge out of more spontaneous 
interactions.  
Levinas nevertheless points out a significant challenge for an enactivist 
understanding of ethics and in that sense complements it: how to account for 
otherness. That is to say, while participatory sensemaking accounts for human 
vulnerability and difference (participation is not guaranteed and can also fail), 
vulnerability understood in this sense is defined in reference to a capable 
subject. Yet, this idea risks to categorize non-participation as a ‘failed’ or 
malfunctioning relation, while several passive or asymmetrical relations have 
ethical meaning, precisely because the other is ‘other’ and incapable of 
participation (e.g. care for a terminally ill person). Levinas complements 
enactivism in that he shows that what is challenging in ethical relations is that 
which we cannot understand or anticipate in our relations with others, that is, 
another’s otherness. 
Finally, enactivism offers an important challenge for Levinas as well: 
How to conceptualize social justice. I argued that even though ethics poses a 
bigger challenge than engaging natural participations, we should nonetheless 
also accept the idea that social justice is a practical and social demand that 
requires participation and equality. This means that one has to abandon 
Levinas’ idea that a relation with otherness is the only condition of justice. 
Justice works on several different levels, naturally flows out of human 
relations and we can only do justice to others in the real world, even though 
this an imperfect world. Yet, given that Levinas’ ethics contributes to a basic 
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enactivist concept of cognition, we can also use this conception of cognition 
as a basis for thinking social justice, without losing significant values 
contained in Levinas’ message about otherness. Levinas and enactivism can 
thus meet half-way, and both add important aspects to ethics.  
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